Introduction
In linguistics, parentheticals have been analyzed from a variety of perspectives. However, not all analyses focus on the same range of phenomena. Thus those linguists who study language as a form of social interaction have tended to treat parentheticals as examples of the sort of disfluency which characterizes unplanned discourse. Their examples include hesitations, revisions and self corrections, incidental comments about what is being said in the host utterance, self-addressed questions and reminders, responses to something external to the conversation, and questions designed to elicit feedback or to check attention, for example:
(1) Uh around the end of the century -it was 1899 wasn't it Such disfluencies, claims Wichmann (2001:189) are 'evidence that speakers have trouble planning their utterances, but are constrained by interactional principles to keep talking'.
In contrast, syntacticians, who are, after all, interested only in syntactically licensed structures, exclude examples such as (1) and (2) (5) My idea, if you really want to know, was to treat the phenomenon as a conventional implicature.
For them, the question is whether such structures can be accommodated within a grammar in which notions of immediate dominance and linear precedence play a central role. 1 Somewhere in between these two approaches, pragmatic analyses have treated parenthetical utterances as examples of the way in which speakers may form their utterances in order to encourage the recovery of a particular interpretation. Thus my (2005, 2006, 2007) analyses have excluded the sort of disfluencies illustrated in (1) and (2) . At the same time, however, they are not restricted to the syntactically licensed examples in (3) -(5), but also include examples such as those in (6) - (8) , where the intervening material is pragmatically integrated with the host even though it is not syntactically related. and we have eye-witness reports -is that they were killed.
(from a discussion of the causes of the extinction of the population of Easter Island, BBC, Radio 4, 26 August 2005, my underlining) .
In this paper, my interest lies in the use of parenthetical structures by writers of fiction, and in particular, by writers of free indirect style or thought (FIS). It seems that interest in the role of parentheticals in free indirect style is largely restricted to those parentheticals which explicitly indicate the source of the represented thought and its mode of representation (See Banfield 1982: 76-88; Ehrlich 1990: 11-14; Fludernik 1993: 165, 240-1, 285-297) . (9) and 10) are Ehrlich's (1990) examples from To the Lighthouse, while (11) and (12) are my own examples taken from Lowry's Under the Volcano (underlining is my own in each case): (9) Her shoes were excellent, he observed (10) Human relations were all like that, . (Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 22) she thought, and the worst (if it had not 4 been for Mr Bankes) were between men and women. (Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 107) (11) Yvonne knew where she was now, but the two alternatives, the two paths, stretched out before her on either side like the arms -the oddly dislocated thought struck her (12) So the 'other' had come again. And now gone,
-of a man being crucified. (Lowry, Under the Volcano, 319) he thought quite, for there was still something there, in some way connected with it, or here, at his elbow, or behind his back, in front of him now …. (Lowry, Under the Volcano, 96)
: but no, not
The significance of these parentheticals lies in the way they affect the interpretation of their hosts. As Reinhart (1983) has argued, sentences of FIS which contain such parentheticals are subject oriented in the sense that the content of their hosts must be interpreted as being represented from the subject's perspective. In contrast, in an indirect thought or speech report the attributed thought is being represented from the speaker's (narrator's) perspective. Compare the free indirect thought (de dicto) report in (13) , which exhibits the characteristic forward pronominalization together with obligatory tense agreement, with the indirect thought (de re) report in (14): John's behaviour (his decision not to drive home, for example).
As Ehrlich (1990) shows, this contrast is nicely illustrated by the difference between (15), which is acceptable, and (16), which is semantically anomalous:
(15) Oedipus i believed that his i mother wasn't his i mother.
(16) His i mother wasn't his i mother, Oedipus i believed.
In (15) the attributed assumption is being represented from the point of view of the speaker, who in contrast with Oedipus, knows that Jocasta is Oedipus' mother.
Accordingly, Oedipus is not being attributed with a contradictory belief. However, in (16) , which exhibits the characteristic forward pronominalization and obligatory tense agreement of sentences of FIS, this speaker oriented interpretation is not possible, and the speaker will be understood to be attributing a contradictory belief to Oedipus.
However, parentheticals in FIS are not restricted to clauses which explicitly indicate the source of a represented thought. One can find the same sorts of parenthetical phenomena as one finds in impersonal descriptive discourse in which events and states of affairs are reported from an objective perspective or in planned personal discourse in which events and states of affairs are reported from the writers/speaker's point of view.
And because a writer uses FIS to represent the thoughts of a character who is not himself/herself engaged in a (deliberate) act of communication or spoken discourse 6 which is not planned, one can also find the sort of parenthethical disfluencies which characterize unplanned personal discourse. In other words, we have the same range of parentheticals which I have illustrated above in (1) - (8) .
Thus for example, the extract in (17), which is a representation of M. Laruelle's thoughts, contains a straightforward example of a syntactically anchored appositive relative clause, while the extract in (18) contains both a syntactically anchored parenthetical and a parenthetical which, although it is not syntactically licensed, is related to the host at a level of pragmatic interpretation in the sense that it makes a metalinguistic comment on a word used to refer to the Consul: are evidence from which we can derive meta-representations of someone's thoughts, and, perhaps, more generally, his state of mind. That is, even if we were to assume that the author's utterances are to be interpreted as utterances that would be made by one of his characters, they cannot be identified with the thoughts they are intended to represent. The reader is intended to use them as linguistic clues for the derivation of metarepresentations of that character's thoughts or state of mind.
Of course, the utterances that we read are not made by a fictional character, but by the author who is representing that character's consciousness. As Sperber & Wilson (1995) have shown, no utterance which is used to represent another person's utterance or thought should be assumed to be a literal reproduction of the original. One can only assume that it resembles it in respects which are relevant in a given context. In fact, as Fludernik (1993: 408) argues, in FIS the linguistic evidence which the author provides for a character's thought cannot be seen as a quasi-verbatim representation of actual utterances or speech or even of actual thought. In many cases, these representations are schematic and even clichéd, consisting of language which is not obviously attributable to either the author or his character. Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976) and Fludernik (1993) have shown that the clichéd and schematic nature of the language of FIS can be exploited for ironic purposes.
The idea that the material that appears in FIS is to be understood as 'a representation of a character's expressions or thoughts as he would express them' (Dillon & Kirchhoff 1976:431, my (2006) describes as SPEAKER ORIENTED expressions and constructions such as expressive adjectives, expressive epithets, and, as we shall see in Section 3.1, parentheticals. These expressions are speaker oriented in the sense that whatever they communicate must be attributed to the speaker even when they are used in an utterance which (explicitly or tacitly) attributes a thought to another person. Consider, for example, the expressive in While A will understand B to be attributing the thought that the referent of the bastards are refusing to reimburse him to the author of the letter, he is unlikely to understand him to be attributing the author of the letter with the assumption that his company merits the 13 expressive epithet the bastards. Whatever is communicated by this epithet will be attributed to B himself.
Similarly, whatever is communicated by the repetition in (25) must be attributed to the speaker even though it is part of an utterance which attributes an assumption to another speaker:
has been reading a letter]
A: Well?
B: They are very sorry and they're going to give me ten pounds, ten pounds.
In contrast, the expressive in (26) and the repetition in (27) will be attributed not to the author, but to the character whose thoughts are being represented (Peter Walsh in (26) and the child Sun in (27):
(26) He would go to Clarissa's party, because he wanted to ask Richard what they were doing in India -the conservative duffers (27) The lovely food that the man had trimmed was all thrown about, and there . (Woolf, Mrs Dalloway, 142, my underlining) were bones and bits of fruit peel and shells everywhere. There was even a bottle lying down with stuff coming out of it on to the cloth and nobody stood it up again.
And the little pink house with the snow roof and the green windows was broken -broken -half melted away in the centre of the Since these constructions are speaker oriented in the sense just explained, their use would suggest that the reader is expected to identify the author's character as the 'speaker' in each case.
However, this cannot be a speaker in the sense of someone who literally speaks or even in the sense of someone who is communicating. As we have seen, this 'speaker' is not necessarily engaged in a communicative act: he may simply be engaged in an act of thinking. And where a character is engaged in a communicative act, this is not presented as one in which the reader is involved as audience. It is simply one which we 'over-hear'
-much in the same way, as we over-hear conversation a recording of conversation on a tape or CD which we happen to find. In other words, while the reader's interpretation is constrained by the expressive, he still has to engage in a certain amount of inferential work.
Similarly, according to Sperber & Wilson's (1995) analysis, the interpretation of (27) would be accounted for by assuming that the repetition is an encouragement to expand the context which has been made accessible by the repeated word, and in this way derive a range of assumptions about Mansfield's character (the child, Sun) that he would not have recovered otherwise. However, as they point out, the audience is not given any particular information about the way in which the context is to be expanded, or about the extent of the expansion. The form of the utterance simply suggests a line of processing and the responsibility for exploring the context is given to the reader.
According to Sperber & Wilson's (1995) Relevance Theory, communicated information comes with a guarantee of OPTIMAL RELEVANCE, so that that any effort an audience invests in its interpretation is rewarded by cognitive effects, or in other words, by an improvement to the MUTUAL COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT of communicator and audience. 5 In the case of utterances such as (27), where much of the responsibility for interpretation is given to the audience (cases of WEAK COMMUNICATION), utterances do not add entirely new assumptions to the mutual cognitive environment of speaker and hearer, but 'marginally increase the manifestness of a great many weakly manifest assumptions', thus creating common impressions rather than common knowledge' (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 224) . In other words, the audience is rewarded by an increased sense of affective mutuality rather than an enlarged mutual cognitive environment.
achieve the greatest possible COGNITIVE EFFECTS for the least amount of processing. In cases where information has not been ostensively communicated, there is no guarantee that processing effort will be rewarded. However, when this principle is applied to communicative behaviour where the communicator's intention to communicate is overt, it gives rise to a specific expectation of relevance simply by virtue of the fact that it is an overt demand for attention. The point is that if the narrator is identifying with a character who is not engaged in an act of communication, then it would seem that there can be no guarantee that the effort we invest in processing the evidence provided will yield a relevant interpretation.
Indeed, as Ehrlich (1990: 105) evidence for the basic layer of information (as in the case of opening a cupboard to let someone see the contents), there is an intention to draw some attention to the fact that the act was intentional and hence that the audience can assume that by paying attention they will discover relevant information. As we have seen, the evidence provided by an author who uses FIS is indirect in the sense that the reader must infer or work out the character's thoughts from the linguistic properties of the utterances together with contextual assumptions. A reader will only invest the sort of effort that is required for these inferences because he has recognized that there has been a communicative intention, and hence that he will be rewarded by an interpretation which is optimally relevant. The point is that the communicative intention must be attributed to the author who is revealing his character's thoughts. As Ehrlich (1990:10) says, 'there is always an intermediary between the reader and the character's speech and thought' -an intermediary whose presence is indicated by the presence of formal properties of indirect discourse, for example 3 rd person (rather than 1 st person) pronouns and back-shifted tense.
Nevertheless, the presence of such an intermediary does not mean that the effort invested in the interpretation of an FIS text is rewarded by improvements to the mutual cognitive environment of reader and author. The reader of an FIS text is not intended to recover meta-representations of the author's thoughts about his character's thoughts, but is given the impression that he is being given evidence for the character's thoughts or state of mind. In other words, the sense of mutuality which is created by the author is a sense of mutuality between reader and character.
If this is right, then FIS cannot be treated alongside examples such as (24) and (25) and ironic utterances as tacitly attributive uses of language, as Wilson (2006) suggests. The idea underlying this analysis is that while all utterances are interpretive representations of thoughts entertained by the speaker, and hence involve one level of meta-representation, an utterance which is used attributively involves a further level of meta-representation, since the thought it represents is itself being used as an interpretation of another (attributed) thought. 7 Utterances such as (24) and (25) The point is that in either case, it will be assumed that any effort invested in interpreting the utterance will be rewarded by improvements to the mutual cognitive environment of audience and speaker rather than the mutual cognitive environment of audience and the person whose thought or utterance is being represented.
However, it seems that the reward for interpreting an FIS text is not the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environment of reader and author, but a sense of mutuality between the reader and the character whose consciousness is being represented.
The notion of interpretive use, and in particular, the extra level of meta-representation it requires does not capture the impression that the evidence that we are given for these characters' thoughts is more direct than in cases such as (24) and (25). As we have seen, this impression is achieved by the use of speaker oriented expressions and constructions 20 which, in contrast with their use in tacitly attributive uses of language, reflect the perspective of the narrator's characters rather than the narrator himself.
At this point the suggestion seems to be that we should remove the author from the picture completely. This would give us analysis more in line with Banfield's (1973) conception of FIS as 'speakerless' text which exhibits no linguistic evidence of a speech event. However, it seems that it would also leave us with the problem of explaining what provides the reader with the justification for investing effort into processing the text.
Moreover, as I have suggested, FIS includes ironic representations of a character's thoughts, a phenomenon which would seem to suggest an authorial presence. And as Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976) and Fludernik (1993, chapter 6) show, complex FIS texts may include passages which are authorial in origin.
In fact, there are really two separate questions here, and correspondingly, two different senses in which we may think of the author as being 'present' in an FIS text.
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On the one hand, there is the question of why a reader should pay attention to the text at all. The answer to this lies in what Fludernik (1993:65) describes as the 'image of a narrator qua producer of the narrative ever hover[ing] on the horizon of the reader's consciousness'. As producer of the narrative, the author is responsible for revealing the consciousness of his character(s), and thus provides us with a guarantee that the effort we invest will be rewarded. In this sense, the author is present simply in the sense that the assumption that it is the author's act of ostension which provides the reader with the expectation that any processing effort will be rewarded.
The other question is frequently presented as a question about 'voice', or sometimes 'perspective', namely, whose voice is the reader 'hearing' in FIS texts, or from whose perspective should an FIS text be interpreted? I would suggest that this question be re-analysed as a question about the mutual cognitive environment which is affected by the interpretation of the text. On this analysis, an FIS is 'speakerless' in the sense that the sense of mutuality that is achieved is not a sense of mutuality between the reader and author (qua producer of the text), but a sense of mutuality between reader and character. In other words, the examples in this section would seem to suggest that there can be a dislocation between author qua source of the guarantee of optimal relevance and 'voice' in the sense that that the relevance of the text is not necessarily defined in terms of an improvement to the mutual cognitive environment of reader and author. However, in the following section we shall see that there are FIS texts which do not exhibit this dislocation and the linguistic evidence orients the reader towards the author rather than his character. Indeed, as we shall see, there are a variety of ways in which an author may communicate an ironic attitude towards his character(s) and in this way develop a sense of collusion between himself and his reader(s).
Authorial intrusion
It has been argued (e.g. by Banfield 1973: 29) that not only can there be a one 'subject of consciousness' for a single sentence of FIS, but that the identity of this subject of consciousness will remain the same over an entire stretch of coherent text (1973:34).
However, as Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976:433) This intrusion does not, however, have to be interpreted as an indication of the narrator's own consciousness. Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976: 435) argue that 'as long as the narrator maintains some marks of the character's point of view, his observations may be taken as something the character might have thought, had he stopped to generalize. The effect is that the generalization is latent in the thought of the character and hence is one that a relatively intelligent character might himself make'.
As we have seen, expressive language and interjections are amongst the formal devices said to be used by readers to identify a passage of FIS as a representation of a character's thoughts. However, as Dillon & Kirchhoff have shown, such language is not always attributable to a character. Consider, for example, the following passage from
Mansfield's 'At the Bay', where in the utterance beginning but no the narrator moves from the rather critical voice of her character Beryl to a more detached voice which is not that of the servant girl Alice herself (note the inverted comma's around the word which, I
assume, is taken from Alice's own vocabulary) but which nevertheless one which is more sympathetic towards her:
(34) And where did a girl like that go to in a place like this. She supposed Alice had picked up some horrible common larrikin and they'd go into the bush together, Pity to make herself so conspicuous; they'd have hard work to hide with Alice in that rig-out.
But no, Beryl was unfair. Alice was going to tea with Mrs Stubbs who'd sent her an "invite" by the little boy who called for orders.
(Mansfield, At the Bay, The Collected Short Stories, 228).
And indeed, it is only a matter of another short paragraph before Mansfield is identifying with Alice completely and we begin to view events from Alice's own perspective.
However, the narrator is not always sympathetic to the character whose thoughts are being represented. As Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976) have shown, the narrator can indicate his dissociation from the thoughts that are being represented. Thus they argue that in the following extract, the utterance introduced by the sentence adverbial as a matter of fact indicates a view which contrasts with that of the character whose thoughts are being represented in the preceding segment: Mrs Verloc, who has just killed her husband, is panicking and hysterical, while the narrator is cool, detached, and perhaps ironic:
(35) She looked up mechanically at the clock. She thought it must have stopped. She could not believe that only two minutes had passed since she had looked at it last. Of course not. It had been stopped all the time. As a matter of fact, only three minutes had elapsed from the moment she had drawn the first deep, easy breath after the blow, to this moment when Mrs
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Verloc formed the resolution to drown herself in the Thames. (Conrad,
The Secret Agent)
As we have seen in the last section, Sperber & Wilson (1995) treat irony as a variety of tacit attributive use of language in which the speaker is communicating an attitude of dissociation from the attributed thought represented. Thus the utterance in (36) is on the analysis outlined an interpretation of a thought which is being used as an interpretation (or echo) of an attributed thought from which the speaker is understood to be dissociating himself:
(36) How generous. After all that inconvenience they are going to reimburse me the princely sum of ten pounds.
By indicating that he is dissociating himself from the thought echoed, the speaker is not simply rejecting the thought echoed: he is also ridiculing it. However, the responsibility for deciding just how ridiculous it is to give someone £10 in the context in which (36) is uttered is given to the hearer. In this way, the utterance achieves relevance in virtue of a range of weakly communicated implicatures which communicate the speaker's attitude towards the thought echoed.
However, the point here is that this range of implicatures is recovered only if it is possible to recognize that the speaker is dissociating himself from the thought echoed. It might be thought that since such dissociation would be impossible in a 'speaker-less' text in which the speaker's own voice is suppressed, we should not expect to find irony in a text in which the only voices are those of the characters whose thoughts are being represented. The fact is that we do. In some cases, the required dissociation is achieved by the author by reminding the reader of his presence. Thus not only do we have the 3 rd person pronouns of indirect speech and thought, but we also find other more ironic forms of reference (for example, Conrad's use of Widow Verloc to refer to a character who has just murdered her husband). Or the author may use vocabulary which would not be used by the character whose thoughts are being represented or which provides only a clichéd representation of those thoughts (cf Fludernik 1993) . Or, as we will see in 3.2.1, the author may even provide a commentary (in a parenthetical, for example) so that the thoughts that are represented are placed in a ludicrous light.
In other cases, however, characters are simply allowed to speak for themselves in contexts which revealed not just through the narrator's descriptive commentary but also through the represented thought of other characters, and as we all know, some speakers are able to make themselves look ridiculous simply by opening their mouths.
This suggests that there is not, after all, a single subject of consciousness in an FIS text and that the sense of mutuality it communicates may be either a sense of mutuality with the character whose thoughts are being represented or a sense of mutuality with the author who is representing that character's thoughts. A parenthetical and its host may represent the consciousness of a single subject and contribute to the sense of mutuality between reader and character. However, we should not be surprised to find parentheticals which communicate a thought from one perspective but which interrupt a thought presented from the perspective of another. In particular, we should not be surprised to find parentheticals which are authorial in origin but which provide a context for the character's thought represented in the host.
Parentheticals in FIS

Parentheticals and affective mutuality
Self-interruptions, digressions, and revisions are characteristic of spontaneous, unplanned discourse. Thus a speaker may be prompted to interrupt his own utterance because of an event or state of affairs in the environment which is perceived by the speaker as requiring an immediate response. Consider, for example, the utterance of the 'Fire!' mid-utterance during a lecture, or 'Pass me a pen' uttered mid-sentence by someone taking a message on the telephone. 10 Alternatively, a revision may reflect the difficulties that the speaker is having finding the most appropriate means of representing a concept or thought.
It is not surprising that an author whose aim is to represent thoughts which themselves are unplanned should produce utterances containing similar kinds of interruptions and revisions. Consider, for example, (37), where Mansfield's character (Monica) is distracted by something she has noticed suddenly, and (38), where the revision is intended to reflect Miss Brill's difficulty in identifying the emotion she is experiencing: Yvonne's thoughts as she enters the bar at the Bella Vista contributes to a complex structure which reflects the complexity of the memories and emotions which are being evoked. Since it is not possible to quote this passage in full, I simply extract the following here:
(39) The bar was empty however.
Or rather it contained one figure. Still in his dress clothes, which weren't particularly dishevelled, the Consul, a lock of fair hair falling over his eyes and one hand clasped in his short pointed beard, was sitting sideways with one foot on the rail […..] talking apparently to himself, for the barman, a sleek dark lad of about eighteen, stood at a little distance against a glass partition that divided the room (from yet another bar, she now remembered now, giving on a side street), and didn't have the air of Now, I have argued elsewhere (Blakemore 2005 (Blakemore , 2006 ) that even in spontaneous discourse the processing effort entailed by a parenthetical interruption may be justified in terms of the speaker's aim of optimizing relevance. In spontaneous discourse, stylistic decisions are made 'on the trot' and are affected by the audience's own contributions and reactions to the discourse. Within these parameters, it may be relevant to modify or revise a stylistic decision mid-utterance if it allows the hearer to construct the right hypothesis about his informative intention without investing unnecessary processing. 12 However, as we have seen, the fictional characters whose thoughts are being represented in FIS are not themselves engaged in ostensive communication and cannot be 30 said to be constrained by the communicative principle of optimal relevance. This suggests that if we attribute the disruptions in the examples above to the character whose thoughts are being represented (rather than the narrator), then it would seem that we cannot say they are justified by the aim of optimizing relevance. In other words, it seems that there can be no sense in which an interruption to the structure of an utterance which we attribute to an author's character can be made with an audience in mind.
There is no doubt that in spite of the formal features indicating the presence of a narrator, we are intended to attribute these structures to the author's character in each of the examples in (37) - (40). In this respect, they contrast with parentheticals in tacitly or explicitly attributive utterances, where they cannot be interpreted as being part of what is being attributed. For example, in contrast with the revision in the FIS example in (38), the revisions in the constructed examples in (41) and (42) must be attributed to the narrator rather than the subject.
(41) Apparently, when she breathed something light and sad -no, not sad, gentle -moved in her bosom.
(42) She said that when she breathed something light and sad -no, not sad, gentle -moved in her bosom.
But this does not mean that the effort which must be invested in the interpretation of the forms that result from the use of parentheticals such as the ones in (37) - (40) is unjustified. As we have seen, it is the narrator's communicative act of revealing their characters' thoughts which justifies the effort which we invest in the interpretation of an 31 FIS text, and this includes the effort which is invested in the interpretation of these parentheticals. That is, while we are intended to attribute these parentheticals to a noncommunicating (fictional) character who does not have an audience in mind, we are also intended to attribute the decision to make these parentheticals publicly available to an author who does.
However, in the cases considered in this section, the reward for this effort does not lie in a meta-representation of the author's thoughts and an improvement to the mutual cognitive environment of reader and author. The reader is rewarded by a heightened impression (or illusion) that he has the sort of direct line to a character's private thought/s which in reality he cannot have. Thus it could be said that these disruptions allow the author to capture the difficulties a character is presumed to have when he experiences a feeling which he does not recognize or which surprises him; to capture the intensity of a feeling or thought which a character is feeling; and to capture the way that the train of a character's thoughts may be interrupted, perhaps because it reminds him of another or perhaps simply because he has just noticed something in the environment. In this way, they allow the reader to gain an impression that he is recovering a more accurate meta-representation of a character's thoughts and thought processes -or in Sperber & Wilson's (1995) terms, an impression of affective mutuality between himself and a fictional character.
Parentheticals and the multi-personal representation of consciousness
As we have seen, authors of FIS texts do not always leave their characters to speak for themselves. Their characters are left to speak in a context which is sometimes made accessible by the representation of the consciousness of other characters, and sometimes provided by the author's own descriptive commentary. By contextualizing the representation of a character's thoughts in this way, the author may, in some cases, establish the sort of dissociation which is required for irony. In other cases, the context simply plays a role in enhancing reader's own meta-representation of the consciousness represented by the author thereby contributing to the impression of affective mutuality just discussed. In this section, we will examine the role that parentheticals play in contextualizing the author's representation of a character's consciousness. The parentheticals discussed in 3.2.1 provide a context for enhancing the reader's impression of affective mutuality between himself and a fictional character, while those discussed in 3.2.2 contribute to the impression of ironic distance.
Contextualizing parentheticals
As I have shown elsewhere (Blakemore 2005 (Blakemore , 2006 , in some cases a parenthetical is pragmatically integrated with its host in the sense that the assumptions they communicate alter the context for its interpretation. For example, in (8) (repeated as (43) below), the parenthetical plays a role in the interpretation of the evidential status of the proposition that the Easter Islanders were killed, or the hearer's understanding of the sense in which the proposition can be said to be obvious:
What is obvious -and we have eye-witness reports -is that they were It seems that by providing this commentary, the author not only allows the reader to recover a meta-representation of M. Laruelle's thought but also a meta-representation of the processes involved in having it, thus increasing the sense of immediacy or affective mutuality between reader and character .
Similarly, in (46) the parenthetical is a commentary provided by the author, while the host is a representation of a thought which must be attributed to his character, Hugh.
In this case, the commentary in the parenthetical ensures that the reader not only recovers a meta-representation of Hugh's thought, but also a meta-representation of Hugh's emotions as he has this thought:
(46) At all events, he thought, his guitar had probably been the least fake thing about him. And fake or not one had certainly been behind most of the major decisions of his life. For it was due to a guitar he'd become a journalist, it was due to a guitar he had become a song-writer, it was largely owing to a guitar even -and Hugh felt himself suffused by a slow liked bridge, and above all women's society, and the fineness of their companionship, and their faithfulness and audacity and greatness in loving which, though it had its drawbacks, seemed to him (and the dark, adorably pretty face was on top of the envelopes) so wholly admirable, so splendid a flower to grow on the crest of human life, and yet he could not come up to the scratch, being always apt to see round things (Clarissa had sapped something in him permanently) , and to tire very easily of mute devotion and to want variety in love … (Woolf, Mrs Dalloway, my underlining) Thus the first four parentheticals in this extract enable us to imagine Walsh as he shaves, buttons his waistcoat, shuffles his papers, and becomes distracted by the picture of Daisy.
And this picture encourages us to imagine other thoughts which Walsh might have, but which are not actually represented in the text thus contributing to our sense of immediacy.
The final parenthetical in the extract is rather different, since it is related to the host in the sense that it provides an explanation for the thought it represents, and its attribution is less obvious. It could be Walsh's answer to his own question (raised by his own thought) and thus part of his own thought processes. Or it could be the author's answer to a question which might be raised in the mind of the reader, in which case it is another example of the sort of phenomenon illustrated in (45) In other cases, however, the parenthetical establishes a distance or dissociation between two subjects of consciousness so that one places the other in a ludicrous light. We turn to such cases in the following section.
Parentheticals and ironic distance
The extract in (49), is taken from Mansfield's story, Prelude. Although Mansfield seems to move back and forth from the perspective of Linda Burnell to that of her husband, Stanley, in this part of the story, it seems that we are intended to empathize with Linda, who is described as being 'worlds away' and watching him 'as if from the clouds'. In other words, we are intended to share her feeling of distance and, indeed, her amusement.
The representations of Burnell -his delight in 'firm, obedient body', his annoyance at the 'idiot' who had fastened the neckband of his shirt, and indeed the parenthetical in ( Similarly, in the following the voice of the disillusioned, defensive drunk in the parenthetical is interpreted against the background of the more objective description in the host, and in this way placed in a ludicrous light:
(51) The drink situation was now this, was this: there had been one drink 39 waiting for him and this drink of beer he had not quite drunk. On the other hand, there had been until recently several drinks of mescal (why not? -the word did not intimidate him, eh?) waiting for him outside in a lemonade bottle and all these he had and had not drunk: had drunk in fact,
had not drunk as far as the others were concerned. (Lowry, Under the Volcano, 304, my underlining)
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that FIS contains features which enable the author to establish the illusion of a direct line between the reader and the character whose consciousness he is representing, or, in other words, a sense of affective mutuality between reader and character which is unmediated by the presence of the author. Thus one can say that in many cases the effort which is invested in the interpretation of an FIS text is rewarded by an increased sense of intimacy between reader and character, even though the guarantee that this effort will be rewarded derives from the author's act of ostensive communication.
At the same time, I have argued, there are features of FIS which lead to an increased sense of mutuality between reader and author, and a corresponding impression of distance between reader and character. In such cases one might say that the reader is rewarded by a sense of absurdity and even a sense of collusion with the author. These features are not restricted to the use of third person pronouns or of back shifted tense, but include the sort of devices discussed by Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976) -for example, ironic forms of address, the use of vocabulary which is more characteristic of the narrator than My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bastard Webster.
The point is that whereas in FIS contexts an expressive is never attributed to the speaker, in indirect speech reports and tacitly attributive utterances an expressive is attributed to the subject only in very specific contexts.
5. (i) Sperber & Wilson (1995) define the COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT of an individual as the set of assumptions which are MANIFEST to an individual at a given time, where MANIFESTNESS is defined in terms of the degree to which an individual is capable of representing an assumption and holding it as true or probably true at a given time. A MUTUAL COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT is a cognitive environment which is shared by a number of individuals and in which it is manifest to those individuals that they share it with each other.
(ii) OPTIMAL RELEVANCE is defined by Sperber & Wilson (1995) in the following way:
An utterance is optimally relevant iff:
(a) it is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it; (b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.
The relevance of an utterance increases with the number of the cognitive effects it yields in a given context, and decreases with the amount of processing effort required for the derivation of those effects. For introductions to relevance theory, see Blakemore (1995) and Wilson & Sperber (2004) .
6. For further discussion, see Pilkington (2000) and .
